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TRANSPORTATION STRIKE CONTROL 
LEGISLATION: A CONGRESSIONAL 
CHALLENGE 
Arthur M. Wisehart• 
LIKE Banquo's ghost, the problem of transportation strikes has haunted Congress with unsettling regularity in recent years. 
The persistence of this troublesome specter was poignantly pictured 
by Congressman Staggers in his introduction to the hearings on the 
1967 railroad shopcraft dispute: 
As I was going up the stair 
I met a man who wasn't there. 
He wasn't there again today. 
Oh, how I wish he'd go away.1 
This "blood-bolter'd Banquo" has "smiled upon" Congress three 
times within the past five years. In each case the visitation took the 
form of a dispute arising under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).2 In 
1963, it was the railroad work rules dispute; in 1966, the five-carrier 
airline strike; and in 1967, the railroad shopcraft dispute. 
In each case Congress has reacted with obvious distaste and has 
achieved little. Advocates of permanent reform, unable even to se-
cure hearings on the subject during nonemergency periods,3 have 
been brushed aside in the atmosphere of urgency surrounding each 
successive transportation crisis with the admonition that stopgap 
measures must receive top priority.4' The result of months of legis-
lative activity has been only ad hoc measures for arbitration of the 
• Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1950, Miami University; M.P.A. 1953, Wayne 
University; J.D. 1954, University of Michigan. Mr. Wisehart is Corporate Secretary 
and Assistant General Counsel of American Airlines, Inc.-Ed. The views stated in this 
Article are those of the author and are not attributable to American Airlines. 
I. Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 559 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90, pt. 7, at 1 (1967). 
2. 45 u.s.c. §§ 151-88 (1964). 
3. See S. REP. No. 292, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967) (statement of Senator Javits); 
ll3 CoNG. REc. 7215 (daily ed. June 14, 1967) (remarks of Congressman Pickle). Senator 
Javits also expressed his frustration in 113 CONG. REc. 6099 (daily ed. May 1, 1967). 
More recently, however, hearings on S. 176 were scheduled by the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery (Senator Tydings, Chairman) 
for Oct. 17-19, 1967. S. 176, introduced by Senator Smathers on Jan. 11, 1967, would 
establish a five-member court of Labor-Management Relations which could make final 
determinations in disputes which adversely affect "the public interest of the Nation 
to a substantial degree." 
4. This has been called the "band aid" approach to labor crises. Statement of 
Congressman Pickle before the Aeronautics Committee of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, May 17, 1967, at 3. On February 16, 1967, Congressman Pickle 
introduced H.R. 5638 which would provide for permanent procedures which are some-
what similar to Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122 (1967). 
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1963 and 1967 railroad disputes,!• Increasing public sentiment in 
favor of permanent reform6 and a presidential request7 for corrective 
legislation following the New York City transit strike have ap-
parently gone unheeded.8 
With the recurrence of such situations, it is apparent that we are 
faced with a failure of government in its most fundamental sense. 
James Madison wrote: "A political system that does not provide for 
a peaceable and authoritative termination of occurring contro-
versies, would not be more than the shadow of a government; the 
object and end of a real government being the substitution of law 
and order, for uncertainty, confusion, and violence."9 
The necessity of protecting the public interest in continuity of 
transportation services while at the same time preserving the insti-
tution of collective bargaining presents a serious dilemma which the 
statutory framework devised during the first third of this century 
now seems inadequate to resolve. Indeed, most crippling strikes 
have occurred after statutory mechanisms for dispute resolution have 
been exhausted. This Article will trace the history of transportation 
labor legislation, outline the shortcomings of present procedures 
for dispute resolution, evaluate various alternatives for statutory 
reform, and propose permanent corrective legislation which would 
5. 77 Stat. 132 (1963); 81 Stat. 122 (1967). 
6. A 1963 survey by the Opinion Research Corporation indicated that 60% of the 
public favored compulsory arbitration of transportation strikes. A 1966 Gallup poll 
on the same subject asked the following question: "If a strike continues for seven 
days, with no agreement reached, would you favor or oppose the idea of a Govern-
ment-appointed committee deciding the issue and compelling both sides to accept the 
terms?" Of those polled, 54% were in favor, 36% were opposed, and 10% had no 
opinion. U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD REPORT, Sept. 5, 1966, at 8. A more recent Gallup poll 
used a slightly different question: "It has been suggested that no strike be permitted 
to go on for more than 21 days. If after 21 days, the union and the employer cannot 
reach an agreement, the courts would appoint a committee that would decide the 
issue and both would be compelled to accept the terms. Would you favor or oppose 
this idea?" Of those responding, 68% were in favor, 22% opposed, and 10% had no 
opinion. World Journal Tribune, April 26, 1967, p. 7, col. 1. 
7. President's State of the Union Message, N.Y. Times, Jan. IZ, 1966, at 14, col. 3: 
"I also intend to ask the Congress to consider measures which, without improperly 
invading state and local authority, will enable us to effectively deal with strikes which 
threaten irreparable damage to the national interest." 
8. Recently Senator Mansfield, the Senate Democratic Leader, reported that the 
President had referred the matter back to Congress. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1967, at 20, 
col. 3. 
9. THE COMPLETE MADISON 153 (Padover ed. 1953). 
In a lecture last year, Professor Arthur Goodhart, now Scholar-in-Residence of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, singled out strikes as one of the 
most serious problems facing the development of the law at the present time. Pro-
fessor Goodhart does not regard the outlook as hopeless, however; he predicts that in 
time the present inadequate procedures for dealing with strikes will seem as outlandish 
as procedures in the thirteenth century now appear. Address by Arthur L. Goodhart 
to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Jan. 18, 1966. 
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a.void the necessity of submitting each dispute for congressional 
resolution on an ad hoc basis. 
l. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The evolution of labor relations in the major transportation 
industries has been characterized by an increased reliance on the 
institution of collective bargaining. When an accumulation of 
employee complaints and grievances caused a breakdown in trans-
portation services, the parties were told to bargain collectively. When 
they refused to do so voluntarily, a duty to bargain was imposed by 
law. To protect the integrity of the bargaining process, other com-
pulsions were legislated: prohibition of employer interference with 
unions, and compulsory third-party determination of disputes in-
volving selection of a bargaining agent. To safeguard the fruits of 
bargaining, collective bargaining agreements were made enforceable 
at law, and when grievances still resulted in strikes, third-party 
determination was made compulsory. 
In "major" disputes involving the formation of new contracts, 
the statutory requirements for notice of change, conferences, status 
quo and cooling-off periods, and mediation were added to give 
collective bargaining the greatest opportunity to function effectively. 
Labor and management, aware of the strong public interest in pre-
venting transportation strikes, agreed upon a final backstop: if the 
parties were unable to settle after following all of the procedures 
designed to safeguard collective bargaining, a presidential emergency 
board would be created to inquire into the dispute, find out who 
was at fault, and recommend a settlement. Acceptance of the settle-
ment was to be virtually compulsory (1) because of the moral com-
mitments by labor and management in agreeing to the legislation 
in the first place, and (2) because of the supposedly coercive effect of 
public opinion. The failure of this procedure to function as origi-
nally intended has contributed significantly to the recurrence of 
major transportation strikes. 
A. Weaknesses of the Early Statutes 
The earliest railway labor legislation, enacted in 1888, followed 
a decade of labor strife.10 This statute, which authorized voluntary 
10. 25 Stat. 501 (1888). The Act followed one year after passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). The strikes of that period are reviewed in detail 
in G. EGGERT, RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES: THE BEGINNINGS OF FEDERAL STRIKE PoUCY 
(1967). 
1700 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 66:1697 
arbitration and investigations by ad hoc commissions, was little 
used11 and was replaced ten years later by the Erdman Act,12 which 
permitted mediation and voluntary arbitration. The Newlands 
Act,13 enacted in 1913 in response to a dispute involving Eastern 
trainmen and conductors,14 established a permanent Board of Medi-
ation and Conciliation which was authorized to intervene in rail-
way disputes on its own initiative. The Act specified that an arbi-
tration award was to be confined to "questions specifically submitted 
or [to] matters directly bearing thereon." But procedures for inter-
preting mediated agreements and arbitration awards were rudimen-
tary in form, and unions complained that management had assumed 
the prerogative of interpreting them.111 Although the Newlands Act 
remained in effect until superseded by the Transportation Act of 
1920, two significant developments intervened which decreased its 
practical importance: the enactment of the Adamson Act in 1916, 
and federal seizure and operation of the railroads during World 
War I. 
The Adamson Act16 was an experiment in the use of congres-
sional power "to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between the 
parties"17 by legislatively fixing the terms of settlement in a particu-
lar labor controversy. The Act, which Congress consciously designed 
to favor the unions directly involved in the dispute, was criticized as 
a capitulation to the demands of labor and as a submission to ex-
pediency.18 President Wilson would have preferred arbitration-
which the railroads had offered to accept-and so stated: "I yield to 
no man in firm adherence, alike of conviction and purpose, to the 
principle of arbitration in industrial disputes .... "19 Other rail-
way unions wanted to share in the concessions granted,20 and the 
labor unrest resulting from the Adamson Act contributed to gov-
ernment seizure of the railroads within a few months after American 
entry into World War I. 
11. See L. LECHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 16 (1955). 
12. 30 Stat. 424 (1898). 
13. 38 Stat. 103 (1913). 
14. See L. LEcHT, supra note 11, at 25. 
15. ADMINISTR.A.TION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR Ac:r BY THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoAIU>, 
19!14-1957, at 80 (1958). 
16. 39 Stat. 721 (1916). 
17. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 351 (1917). 
18. See E. BERMAN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1924), 
reprinted for the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., in Library of Congress LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, 
Federal Legislation To End Strikes: A Documentary History (pt. I) 63, 77 (1967). 
19. E. BERMAN, supra note 18, at 72. 
20. See w. HINES, WAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 18 (1928). 
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Railway unions were generally enthusiastic about the results of 
government operation.21 During the period of seizure, national 
agreements were established, adjustment boards were created for 
grievances, pay rates went up, and union representation increased. 
From other points of view, however, the results were less desirable. 
One Senator recently commented that government operation of the 
railroads created "the most tangled mess that could possibly be imag-
ined."22 His investigations revealed that thirty years after the date 
of seizure a sizeable government office was still engaged in trying 
to unravel the legal intricacies of government operation and the 
numerous damage suits which followed.23 Moreover, the most trouble-
some labor disputes during the decade following restoration to pri-
vate operation by the Transportation Act of 192024 were inherited 
from the period of government control. 
The Transportation Act of 1920 contained its own labor relations 
provisions which virtually supplanted the Newlands Act. The 1920 
statute relied primarily upon determinations by a Railroad Labor 
Board comprised of three management representatives, three labor 
representatives, and three public representatives. The Board's ef-
fectiveness, however, was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's 
narrow interpretations of its authority. The Court held that the 
Board was intended to act as an arbitral agency whose decisions 
were enforceable only by public opinion,25 and that the statute did 
not require the railroads to recognize or deal with labor unions.26 
The Court later ruled that Congress had not intended to forbid 
activities whose prohibition would be taken for granted today: re-
fusal to confer or bargain, interference with organizational activi-
ties, refusal to comply with a Railroad Labor Board election, and 
coercion or discrimination against employees because of union mem-
bership.27 Other causes of dissatisfaction developed, and the unions 
eventually boycotted the Railroad Labor Board.28 
Thus, prior to the passage of the RLA, peaceful settlement of 
transportation labor controversies was hampered by weak statutes 
affording few alternatives to the strike for resolution of disputes. 
The Newlands Act had provided for mediation, and the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920 included a procedure for compulsory fact-finding; 
21. See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 37. 
22. 113 CONG. REc. 7806 (daily ed. June 7, 1967) (statement of Senator Holland). 
23. Id. 
24. 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920). 
25. Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 80 (1923). 
26. 261 U.S. at 85. 
27. Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925). 
28. See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 43. 
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but an enforceable duty to bargain, third-party determination of 
disputes involving bargaining units and representatives, a prohibi-
tion against interference by employers, status quo periods, proce-
dures for enforcement of bargaining agreements, and mandatory 
grievance arbitration had not been incorporated in any of the 
early statutes.29 These shortcomings and the practical ineffectiveness 
of the Transportation Act highlighted the need for congressional 
action. 
B. Experience Under the RLA 
The labor relations of the railroads (and of the airlines since 
1936) have been governed by the RLA,30 which was passed in 1926 
29. A comparison of the various pieces of legislation is set out below: 
COMPARISON OF RAILROAD LABOR LAWS 
Rail-
way 
Labor 
Act 
(1926, 
New- as 
Erdman lands Transpor- amend-
Act of Act Act tation Act ed in 
1888 (1898) (1913) (1920) 1934) 
Provisions outlawing 
blacklisting, yellow-dog 
contracts, and anti-union 
discrimination No Noa No No Yes 
Enforceable duty to 
bargairt No No No Nob Yes 
Noninterference with 
choice of bargaining 
representative No No No No Yes 
Designation of bargaining 
representative No No No No Yes 
Determination of 
bargaining unit No No No No Yes 
Mediation No Yes Yes Noc Yes 
Compulsory fact-finding Yes No No Yes Yes 
Status quo periods No Limited No No Yes 
Enforcement of bargaining Nonenforce-
agreements; grievance able deter-
arbitration No No No minations Yes 
Arbitration of terms of Non enforce-
new contracts Volun- Volun- Volun- able deter- Volun-
tary tary tary minations tary 
a Provisions outlawing blacklists and yellow-dog contracts were held unconstitu-
tional in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
b See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923). 
c The Board of Mediation and Conciliation established under the Newlands Act 
was still in existence. 
30. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964). 
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after months of intensive negotiations resulted in an agreement be-
tween representatives of labor and management.31 To "insure to the 
public continuity and efficiency of interstate transportation ser-
vice,"32 the RLA relied upon the parties' sense of moral obligation 
and the ostensibly coercive effect of public opinion rather than 
upon enforceable obligations. Since the bill was the product of an 
agreement between labor and management, 33 it was assumed that 
the parties would be under a "moral obligation to see that their 
agreement accomplishes its purpose."34 If a sense of moral obliga-
tion proved insufficient, the backers of the RLA expected that public 
opinion would force the parties to accept the recommendations of 
a presidential emergency board appointed to report the situation 
to the public.35 A union spokesman commented that if the parties 
"stand out for unreasonable conditions, if they take an unreasonable 
or unfair position, and that blocks the settlement . . . then this 
board, with all its power and prestige, can go to the public and 
crystallize public opinion against the parties responsible for not 
maintaining peace,"36 
The RLA has been instrumental in preventing certain kinds of 
labor disputes from developing into strikes. 
I. Interference with the Bargaining Representative 
Before the passage of the RLA, direct employer interference with 
unions led to many railroad strikes.37 Management sidetracked the 
31. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 80-91 (1915). Mr. 
Donald A. Richberg, labor's representative in drafting the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 
has written in retrospect: 
The fight for the Railway Labor Act, which was inaugurated in 1923, was one 
of the most critical battles over labor legislation ever waged in Congress. At the 
time such fundamental questions as the right of labor to organize, to be recog-
nized by management, to engage in collective bargaining, and to establish trade 
agreements binding throughout a trade or industry were all bitterly in dispute. 
The country had just experienced the first and only nationwide strike of railroad 
employees, and tremendous public antagonism and much fear of any increased 
power in organized labor had been aroused. The American people were just 
coming out of the first post-war depression and in no mood to be tolerant of 
labor disputes which interrupted production or distribution. Indeed, the strongest 
argument which the railroad employees had was that they were voluntarily mak-
ing proposals designed for the unusual purpose of preventing, rather than abetting 
strikes. 
D. RICHBERG, LABOR UNION MONOPOLY 17-18 (1957). 
32. H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926). See also 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 
45 U.S.C. § 15l(a) (1964) for a statement of the Act's purpose. 
33. Hearings on S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 69th 
Cong., 1st Sess, 37 (1926). 
3·i. Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1926). 
85. Hearings, supra note 34, at 18. See also 22 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 18 (1956); 17 
N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951). 
86. Hearings, supra note 34, at 19. 
87. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203 (1925); Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72 (1923). 
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Railroad Labor Board's established election procedures by conducting 
its mm elections; votes for the union were not counted, and only 
ballots cast for individual employees were considered valid. As a 
result, often on the strength of a minority of votes cast, the railroads 
recognized individuals as bargaining representatives, paid their sala-
ries and expenses, and negotiated agreements with them. The conse-
quence was frequently a strike. Yet, as has been noted, the Supreme 
Court had held that the Transportation Act did not prohibit this 
kind of direct interference with union representation.38 
The RLA removed such activities by management as a source of 
friction. Upholding an injunction against a railroad, the Supreme 
Court in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Rail-
way & Steamship Clerks89 accepted the union's argument that 
"the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor 
Act was 'to provide a machinery to prevent strikes.' "40 Although the 
RLA looked toward "amicable adjustments," the Court insisted that 
"freedom of choice in the selection of representatives on each side 
of the dispute is the essential foundation of the statutory scheme.''41 
2. Refusal To Bargain 
None of the prior statutes had imposed a duty to bargain, and 
even the requirement in section 30 I of the Transportation Act42 that 
the parties confer was held unenforceable by the Court.43 However, 
in Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation No. 40,44 the 
Court decided that the RLA (as amended in 1934)45 placed an af-
firmative, enforceable duty upon carriers to recognize and deal with 
unions in collective bargaining. With this development, another 
source of strikes was eliminated. As Justice Douglas stated in an 
excellent analysis of the legislative development: "Thus what had 
long been a 'right' of employees enforceable only by strikes and 
other methods of industrial warfare emerged as a 'right' enforceable 
38. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. 
39. 281 U.S. 548 (1930). 
40. 281 U.S. at 565. 
41. 281 U.S. at 569. 
42. 41 Stat. 469 (1920). 
43. 281 U.S. at 565. 
44. 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
45. 48 Stat. 1185 (1934). Among the amendments was a provision correcting a de-
ficiency which troubled (but did not deter) the Court in Texas tr New Orleans Rail-
road: the absence of a statutory penalty for intereference. Section 2, 10th, making it a 
crime to interfere with bargaining representatives, was added in 1934. 48 Stat. 1189 
(1934), 45 u.s.c. § 152, 10th (1964). 
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by judicial decree. The right of collective bargaining was no longer 
dependent on economic power alone."46 
3. Selection of a Bargaining Representative 
Prior to passage of the RLA, carriers were permitted to deal with 
company unions representing only a minority of the employees,47 
but the resulting disputes stymied bargaining and led to numerous 
strikes. Under the RLA, railroads were no longer free to interfere 
with employee organization.48 However, the original version of the 
RLA contained no enforceable procedures for determining who the 
bargaining representative would be. To fill this void, the 1934 
amendments created the National Mediation Board.49 Section 2, 9th, 
of the amended act was aimed specifically at the practice of refusing 
to recognize employee-elected representatives while maintaining 
company unions. It provided a means for ascertaining the employee 
representatives through intervention and certification by the Media-
tion Board and required the carriers to deal with the bargaining 
agent so certified.50 The 1934 amendments also gave the National 
Mediation Board responsibility for determining the proper "craft 
or class" of employees for bargaining purposes51-a question which 
had been another cause of strikes. These determinations have been 
held to be virtually immune from judicial review.52 
4. Grievances 
The RLA, like the Transportation Act of 1920, provided for the 
establishment of adjustment boards for grievances. Resort to these 
boards originally depended upon voluntary agreement, and "mi-
nor" disputes involving grievances and issues of contract interpreta-
tion and application continued to be a serious source of friction.53 
In 1934, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation reported to 
Congress that "[g]rievances on a number of roads in the past few 
years have accumulated to such an extent that the only remedy the 
46. General Comm. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 330 (1943). 
47. Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 217 (1925). 
48. Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 557 (1930). 
49. 45 U.S.C. § 152, 9th (1964). 48 Stat. 1185 (1934). 
50. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545-46 (1937). 
51. 45 u.s.c. § 152, 9th (1964). 
52. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-
Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965); Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297 
(1943). 
53. See L. LECHT, supra note 11, at 74-75. 
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m~n could see was to threaten a strike and thus secure appointment 
by the President of a fact finding board which could go into the 
whole situation."54 To solve this problem, the 1934 amendments 
changed the adjustment board provisions into a form of compulsory 
arbitration later characterized by the Supreme Court as a "reason-
able alternative" to economic warfare.55 Other deficiencies of adjust-
ment board procedures became apparent, and in 1966 Congress 
acted56 to expedite adjustment board determinations and give them 
greater binding effect.57 As a result, another cause of work stoppages 
was eliminated. 
C. Shortcomings of the RLA: Formation of 
New Agreements 
Strikes during the formation of new agreements are to be averted 
under the RLA by imposition of an enforceable duty to bargain, 
noninterference with the bargaining agent, mediation services, cool-
ing-off periods, and possible appointment of a presidential emergency 
board, A detailed dispute resolution mechanism is provided: notice 
of an intent to change the contract terms is to be given by one or 
both of the parties followed by direct negotiations, mediation by 
the National Mediation Board, a proffer of voluntary arbitration, a 
thirty-day cooling-off period, and if a strike threat results in the 
appointment of a presidential emergency board, a report by the board 
and another thirty-day cooling-off period. During this process, the 
existing terms of employment must be maintained58 and resort to 
"self-help" is prohibited.59 Once these procedures have been com-
pleted, however, the parties are free to engage in economic warfare.60 
It is at this point that the RLA has too often failed to accomplish its 
stated objectives. 
Early experience under the RLA was favorable, however, and 
almost invariably both parties accepted the emergency board recom-
mendations as the basis for dispute settlement.61 In an eight-year 
54. Hearings on H.R. 9861 Before the House Rules Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 
(1934). 
55. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &: Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 
30, 41 (1957). The legislative history is also discussed in Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 
U.S. 601, 608-16 (1959). 
56. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
57. See Note, Adjusting the Adjustment Board: Jurisdictional and Judicial Review 
Amendments to Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, 42 !ND. L.J. 109 (1966). 
58. Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
817 (1964). 
59. Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. &: S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966). 
60. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. B. &: 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963). 
61. See 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 32 (1951). 
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period following the passage of the RLA, there were only three in-
consequential railroad strikes.62 Apparently on the assumption that 
transportation strikes had become outmoded, the RLA was extended 
in 1936 to include the airlines.63 However, with the railroad wage 
movements of 1941 the pattern changed dramatically. It has since 
become customary for the unions to reject emergency board recom-
mendations, using them instead only as a basis "for securing further 
wage and rule concessions in a final settlement, usually made under 
Executive auspices."64 As one commentator explained: "The award 
. . . serves as a baseline measuring the minimum changes to be in-
corporated in the new contract. Employee organizations have sought 
to extend their gain through further negotiations in which the car-
riers may also offer additional counter proposals."65 
Many commentators have become concerned that automatic re-
jection of emergency board recommendations by unions is the princi-
pal reason that this procedure has not had its intended effect in recent 
years.66 One labor historian observed that "the significant collective 
bargaining development has usually occurred after the report was 
issued and found unacceptable. The unions have been the active 
group in rejecting board reports."67 In the airline industry, for in-
stance, there have been thirty-three emergency boards, most of which 
made specific recommendations for the settlement of existing contro-
versies over wages. One airline personnel vice president has com-
mented that "[w]e can recall no instance in which the unions ever 
accepted such a recommendation; in every case the carriers have 
62. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553 n.7 (1937). 
COMPARISON OF MAN-DAYS LOST DUE TO STRIKES 
1936 
1933 1934 1935 CTan.-May) 
Water Transportation 32,752 1,068,867 749,534 119,820 
Motor Transportation 155,565 859,657 202,393 46,054 
Railroads 0 0 56 0 
63. 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964). See Kahn, Settle-
ment of Airline Labor Disputes, 37 PAPER OF THE MlCHIGAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ARTS 
AND LETrERs 289 (1952) for an analysis of the airlines' early experience under the 
Railway Labor Act. Later developments are covered in Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent 
Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 22 (1960). 
64. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951). 
65. L. LEcHT, EXPERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 15 (1955). See also 
KAUFMAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 154-55 (1954); E. McNATT, 
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY, 1947-1957, at 29 (1958). 
66. See 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 32 (1951). 
67. L. LEcHT, supra note 65, at 6 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
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been required to pay more than this independent agency has thought 
proper to pay."68 
The three major transportation labor crises which have required 
congressional attention in the past four years arose after the statutory 
procedures for dealing with the formation of new contracts had been 
completed. In each case, the dispute had been submitted to a presi-
dential emergency board69 whose recommendations were accepted by 
the carriers but rejected by the union or unions involved. After non-
statutory intervention of various types proved ineffective, each dis-
pute required congressional attention for a protracted period. 
In the two railroad disputes, ad hoc legislation was enacted70 to 
end the strikes. In the airline strike, an ad hoc bill passed the Senate 
but the dispute was settled before the House completed action.71 
Before the settlement was achieved, however, more than seventy 
cities in the United States were deprived of all trunkline air service 
for forty-three days, and 230 cities lost more than seventy per cent of 
such service during the same period.72 The strike grounded millions 
of would-be passengers,73 caused 135,000 employees (including 
100,000 not involved in the dispute) to lose earnings,74 cost the 
airline industry eighty-two million dollars in net income (the struck 
carriers lost 103 million dollars),75 and violated the presidential wage 
guidelines, thus contributing to a series of inflationary settlements.76 
Senator Morse, who chaired the presidential emergency board 
which investigated and reported on the dispute, stated on the Senate 
floor that employees of a regulated industry characterized by a high 
degree of public investment should not be permitted to injure the 
public interest by crippling air transportation: 
68. Statement by Everett M. Goulard, Vice President, Industrial Relations, Pan 
American World Airways, on behalf of American Airlines, Eastern Air Lines, National 
Airlines, Pan American World Airways, and Trans World Airlines, before the Special 
Committee on National Strikes in the Transportation Industries of the American Bar 
Association, May 5, 1967, at 18 [hereinafter Goulard Statement]. Reasons for the failure 
of emergency board recommendations in airline disputes are discussed in Kahn, supra 
note 63, at 297-98. 
69. Emergency Boards No. 154 (1963), No. 166 (1966), and No. 169 (1967). 
70. 77 Stat. 132 (1963); 81 Stat. 122 (1967). 
71. S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See Curtin, National Emergency Dis• 
putes Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in the Transportation Industries, 55 GEo. 
L.J. 786, 790 (1967). 
72. See Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 186 Before the House Gomm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 167 (1967). 
73. See Goulard Statement 7. 
74. Id. 
75. See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE Anu.INE 
INDUSTRY OF THE IAM STRIKE 2 (1967). 
76. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 790. 
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They should not be allowed to use their naked economic power to 
force out of the carriers-and, not so indirectly, out of the taxpayers, 
in the long run-a settlement in this case that will be highly in-
flationary in nature. Their action can be used as the bellwether for 
additional inflationary settlements from the major industries that 
are waiting in the wings to have their disputes settled.77 
Among the major unions "waiting in the wings" were those rep-
resenting the railroad workers. The International Association of 
Machinists (JAM), the union which was responsible for the airline 
strike, also made a railroad settlement impossible. Senator Morse 
commented that "the irresponsible action of the machinists is hav-
ing a deleterious effect upon the concept of collective bargaining and 
may well be bringing all regulated industry closer to permanent 
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration of their labor dis-
putes."78 
As damaging as the tactics of the JAM were to the public interest, 
they should not have surprised students of collective bargaining. 
The JAM has an obvious interest in retaining its position as bar-
gaining representative and in acquiring new members. To accomplish 
these objectives, a union must negotiate a settlement which is not 
only fair, but one which its members believe to be as good as or 
better than any other bargaining representative could have achieved. 
The JAM's actions in the airline dispute were attributable at least 
in part to a challenge from rival unions.79 After negotiating a 
spectacular settlement for its airline members, the JAM had to con-
vince its railroad members that they were no less favored. 
Public opinion has not functioned as originally planned in com-
pelling acceptance of emergency board recommendations. Unions 
have rejected those recommendations in hope of achieving higher 
settlements, while management, subject to the pressures of being in 
a regulated industry, has continued to accept them. These recom-
mendations have thus become a one-sided form of arbitration: bind-
ing on management but not on labor; simply escalating the award 
rather than settling the dispute. 
77. 112 CONG. REC. 17,491 (1966). 
78. 113 CONG. REc. S7791 (daily ed. June 7, 1967). 
79. The Transport Workers Union represents employees of a number of airlines, 
and within the last three years organizational efforts by the Teamsters and the Airline 
Mechanics Fraternal Association have sought to dislodge International Association of 
Machinists (IAM) representation. See Landauer, Teamsters and an &udacious Leader, 
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1966, at 6, col. 3. 
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II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
Action must be taken to avoid frustration of the RLA's original 
purpose-the avoidance of "any interruption to commerce or to the 
operation of any carrier engaged therein."80 I£ public opinion does 
not have the expected coercive effect, something must be substituted 
to secure acceptance of emergency board recommendations. Even 
before the airline and railroad episodes described above, the Na-
tional Mediation Board warned: "The present situation, if it con-
tinues, can result only in a complete breakdown of the machinery for 
the settlement of wage and rules disputes which was so carefully 
and hopefully constructed by the legislators and sponsors of the 
Railway Labor Act in 1926."81 
As previously indicated, Congress has not hesitated to provide 
a remedy when the purposes of the Railway Labor Act could not be 
achieved through voluntary action. When "free" collective bargain-
ing would not work, Congress made it compulsory; when carriers 
would not stop interfering with unions, penalties were added; when 
quarrels over the identity of the bargaining agent and the scope of 
the bargaining unit blocked negotiations, Congress provided for 
independent determination of such issues; and, when the parties 
were unable to settle grievances, Congress provided for the manda-
tory resort to adjustment boards. Similar corrective action should 
now be taken.82 Several alternative courses of action which have 
been suggested for dealing with the present situation are considered 
below. 
A. Maintain the Status Quo 
One alternative would be to continue to rely on the force of 
moral obligation and public pressure to enforce emergency board 
recommendations. However, recent experience indicates that their 
combined force is not strong enough to have the effect originally 
intended. The National Mediation Board has suggested that "in 
practice ... the varied and oftentimes technical issues involved in 
such cases receive so little publicity, and are so difficult of under-
standing by the general public, that the effect anticipated when the 
law was passed has been entirely lost."83 Whatever the reason, pub-
lic opinion has not played its anticipated coercive role with respect 
80. 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964). Only recently the National 
Mediation Board docketed a petition by the Airline Mechanics' Fraternal Association 
to supplant the IAM on United Airlines. 
81. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951). 
82. See 19 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 7 (1953). 
83. 17 N.M.B. ANN. REP. 33 (1951). 
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to emergency board recommendations, and the original commitment 
to a moral obligation appears to have been forgotten. 
In any event, the assumption that the status quo is being pre-
served simply because the laws on the statute books remain the same 
is far from realistic. Serious strike threats result in a great variety of 
nonstatutory improvisation which may include White House media-
tion, implicit or overt threats of cancellation of government con-
tracts, adverse determinations with respect to routes, fares, or future 
contracts, punitive legislation, tax reviews, antitrust investigations, 
the sale of stockpiled commodities on the open market, or the ap-
pointment of a nonstatutory board to make higher recommenda-
tions. 84 When such pressures succeed, the result is paradoxically 
hailed as another triumph of "free" collective bargaining; success is 
also advanced as another reason why statutory change is unnecessary. 
In fact, such extra-statutory activity demonstrates that legislative 
change is urgently needed. As in every form of governmental activ-
ity, public policy requires that intervention in labor disputes, when 
essential, be a civilized exercise of power. The forms and procedures 
employed when government is forced to intervene in labor disputes 
must be such as to inspire public confidence in the fundamental 
fairness of the government's action. 
As the railroad and airline disputes illustrate, intervention outside 
the present statutory framework has usually taken the form of ad hoc 
legislation when all other forms of improvisation have failed. Ad-
vocates of this approach argue that such legislation can be tailored 
to fit the particular controversy, and that the lack of control over 
the content of a legislated settlement will impel the parties to bar-
84. See Sloane, National Emergency Strikes: The Danger of Extralegal Success, 
BusINESs HORIZONS, Summer 1967, at 91. In the railroad shopcraft dispute, Emergency 
Board No. 169 (1967) made recommendations for a settlement which the railroads 
accepted but the unions rejected. The subsequent nonstatutory Fahy Board recom-
mended a settlement more favorable to labor. See History of the Railroad Shopcraft 
Dispute in Hearings on S.J. Res. 81 Before the Subcomm. on Labor and· Public Wel-
fare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 441-43 (1967). It took little imagination to foresee that the 
Special Board established under Pub. L. 90-54 [81 Stat. 122 (1967)] would add even more 
sweeteners. See Raskin, That "Slave Labor Law" Twenty Years Later, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
21, 1967, at 30, col. 5. In its final determination, the Special Board adopted the Fahy 
Board's recommendations for the eighteen months covered thereby and added a five 
per cent increase and a five cent skill differential for an additional six months. The 
Report of the Special Board, Senator Morse's explanatory statement, and the critical 
individual statement of Board Member Frederick R. Kappel are set forth in 113 
CONG. REc. 13,077-82 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1967). 
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, Presidential boards are forbidden to make recom-
mendations on the merits. But the President is completely free to appoint nonstatu-
tory boards at will, which are subject to no such limitation. An example is the Morse 
board appointed by President Kennedy in connection with the 1963 East Coast long-
shoretnen's strike. 
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gain.85 There are, however, a number of serious disadvantages to 
this approach.86 A legislative solution to each serious dispute con-
s1:1mes a great deal of congressional time and attention. Congress 
is not designed to rule in individual cases; such functions are more 
sensibly delegated to administrative agencies better equipped to 
tailor their actions to particular situations. Perhaps the greatest dis-
advantage is that, as the railroad and airline controversies demon-
strate, ad hoc legislative efforts tend to stifle collective bargaining. 
B. End Government Intervention 
It has been proposed that all government intervention be elimi-
nated, with a reversion to a laissez-faire system in which dispute res-
olution depends solely upon the parties' economic muscle.87 But 
it is clear that government intervention in one form or another is 
inevitable when a labor dispute threatens the general welfare of any 
segment of society. Government cannot sit idly by when the nation's 
rail or air transportation is disrupted, when New York City's sub-
ways are shut dmvn, or even when a needed hospital is closed. 
Every aspect of collective bargaining as we know it rests upon 
some form of government intervention. By imposing a duty to rec-
ognize unions, deal with them fairly, and bargain in good faith, 
"government intervention" provides the equality of power upon 
which collective bargaining depends. Government is also responsible 
for protecting arbitration, making mediation available, and determin-
ing the proper representatives in jurisdictional disputes. It seems 
obvious that some form of governmental intervention will persist 
in virtually all labor disputes. The questions in each case must be 
(I) whether such intervention is fair, (2) whether it takes a form 
approved by our society, and (3) whether it is effective. Governmental 
intervention in serious transportation strikes has too often failed 
on all three counts. 
C. Include the Airlines and Railroads Under the Taft-Hartley Act88 
Another frequently suggested change is that the airlines and 
railroads be brought under the Taft-Hartley Act.89 Some forms of 
85. See Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in AMERICAN AssEMBLY, 
CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 168, 177-78 (1967). 
86. The clumsiness of ad hoc legislation for dealing with an individual situation 
is exemplified by the Adamson Act, discussed in text accompanying notes 16-20 supra. 
87. See H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
LAnoR DISPUTES 211 (1966). See also U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining, 
NATION'S BUSINESS, March 1962, at 38 (interview with Mr. David L. Cole). 
88. 29 u.s.c. §§ 141-87 (1964). 
89. See Fleming, Collective Bargaining Revisited, a paper presented to the Labor 
June 1968] Transportation Strike Legislation 1713 
transportation-notably the trucking and maritime industries-are 
already subject to Taft-Hartley coverage, but their experience hardly 
suggests that the airlines and railroads should also be included.90 
From the standpoint of transportation, the Taft-Hartley Act 
offers few advantages and contains some positive disadvantages: 
grievance disputes can still be a source of strikes;91 status quo and 
cooling-off periods are not as widely available; mediation has less 
power and flexibility; and there is no requirement that unions be 
organized on a system-wide basis. Moreover, the fact that presidential 
boards have no power to make recommendations on the merits of 
disputes has been long criticized as a defect.92 The RLA, on the other 
hand, was developed solely as a transportation measure and it has 
been successful in narrowing the causes of economic warfare. The 
only remaining difficulty with the RLA is how to handle "major" 
disputes after the statutory procedures have failed, and this problem 
also exists under the Taft-Hartley Act. 
D. Seizure 
Seizure is frequently advocated by unions for an obvious reason: 
the history of governmental seizure as a means of settling labor dis-
putes indicates that after seizure the workers have usually been given 
some or all of the benefits which they could not get from their em-
ployer.93 When the strike emergency has ended and the business is 
returned to private management, management in effect has been 
required to accept a settlement it would not otherwise have ac-
cepted. 9¼ 
The chief disadvantage of seizure is that it does nothing to resolve 
a dispute unless it is accompanied by an executive decree fixing the 
terms of employment. However, the issuance of such a decree is 
tantamount to compulsory arbitration of the worst kind. Moreover, 
Management Institute of the American Arbitration Association, Nov. 1966, at 23. Cf. 
Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlement, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1967: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE THIRTE£NTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 185, 200 (1967). 
90. Nine of the twenty-six Presidential Boards of Inquiry appointed under the 
Taft-Hartley Act have involved maritime disputes. See Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service, Emergency Disputes Under the Taft-Hartley Act, reprinted for the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public '\\Telfare, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
To END STRIKES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, pt. I, at 575 (Comm. Print 1967). 
91. E.g., see Sinclair Refinery Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). 
92. See Seidman, National Emergency Strike Legislation, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR 
RELATIONS LAW 473, 478, 491 (1961). 
93. See Hearings, supra note 84, at 136 (statement of G. E. Leighty, Chairman, 
Railway Labor Executives Association). 
94. See FEDERAL LEGISLATION To END STRIKES, mpra note 90, at 379. 
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unless the demands of the union are met, the effectiveness of seizure 
in controlling strikes is questionable.95 Government operation in 
New York City and elsewhere has been no guarantee against strikes. 
The heavy administrative burden which seizure places on the gov-
ernment and the lengthy legal proceedings which are likely to 
result96 are other disadvantages. Therefore, an expedient so alien to 
our economic system does not seem to be a supportable alternative. 
E. Compulsory Arbitration 
It is perhaps too much to hope for objective consideration of 
compulsory arbitration. The subject has frequently been treated as 
one for unsophisticated argument;97 discussion tends to proceed in 
simplistic "pro" and "con" terms. The emotional overtones carried 
by the word "compulsory" further obstruct careful analysis. We 
should not, however, allow our attention to be diverted by this epi-
thet. As demonstrated earlier, other once-controversial forms of 
compulsion are incorporated in the RLA and are now accepted as a 
matter of course. 
Compulsory arbitration is the subject of many common beliefs 
which either have no application to transportation enterprises or are 
of doubtful -validity. One such belief is that compulsory arbitration 
will not be effective in controlling strikes. Grievance and contract 
interpretation disputes have already been subjected to compulsory 
arbitration, however, and strikes are no longer a problem in these 
areas.98 Third-party determination has also been effective in pre-
venting jurisdictional disputes and controversies over the choice of 
bargaining representatives from developing into strikes. Finally, ad 
hoc congressional provisions for compulsory arbitration ended the 
national railroad strikes in 1963 and 1967. Whether compulsory 
arbitration would be effective in preventing strikes if used regu-
larly in other "major" disputes would depend upon the fairness and 
neutrality of the procedures employed. But the use of compulsory 
arbitration in proper cases could provide a constructive device to 
enable workers in vital public service industries to achieve wage 
95. "Between 1945 and 1953 seizure proved ineffective to prevent a stoppage on 
numerous occasions." Cox, Seizure in Emergency Disputes, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND 
NATIONAL Poucy 227 (1955). See also Katz, Emergency Dispute Settlement, in LAnoR 
LAw DEVELOPMENTS 1967, at 223, 237. 
96. See statement of Senator Holland in text accompanying note 22 supra. 
97. See "The Pros and Cons of Compulsory Arbitration" published in 1965 by 
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as a high school debate manual. 
98. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River 8: Indiana R.R., 353 U.S. 30 
(1957). 
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equality without having to resort to strikes endangering public 
health and safety.o0 
Compulsory arbitration has been used extensively in Australia 
and New Zealand. While it has not eliminated strikes in those coun-
tries, it seems to have reduced their impact. In testimony before a 
Senate subcommittee, Samuel J. Rosenman stated on the basis of his 
visits with labor union leaders in Australia, that "[t]he arguments 
usually advanced in this country against any form of compulsory arbi-
tration were dismissed by them as contrary to their experience with 
labor courts."10° Closer to home, compulsory arbitration for public 
utilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania has either eliminated strikes 
or materially reduced them.101 Thus, the evidence seems to indicate 
that compulsory arbitration has been at least partially effective in 
controlling strikes. 
Although some believe that compulsory arbitration would lead 
to price control, government control of transportation "prices" has 
existed since 1887. Even as to unregulated industries, the assertion 
that compulsory arbitration would lead to price fixing is too cate-
gorical.102 
A third myth is that compulsory arbitration would interfere 
with the collective bargaining process. It is sometimes argued that 
under compulsory arbitration the parties might tend to slight the 
bargaining process in order to present their &trongest positions to 
the arbitrator. However, the experience in Australia and New Zea-
land indicates that compulsory arbitration has not destroyed col-
lective bargaining. In New Zealand, for instance, the Secretary of 
Labour has estimated that 80 per cent of the disputes subject to 
arbitration are settled by bargaining.103 In the United States, com-
99. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1966, at 9, col. 3. 
100. Statement by Samuel I. Rosenman in Hearings on S. 176 Before the Subcomm. 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 26-27 (1967); Sykes, Labor Arbitration in Australia, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 
216, 248 (1964). The Goulard Statement, at 20, indicates that the figures for man-days 
lost due to strikes per 1,000 employees in New Zealand and Australia were 72 and 191, 
respectively, compared with 318 for the United States. 
101. R. FRANCE&: R. LESTER, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF UTILITY DISPUTES IN NEW 
JERSEY ,\ND PENNSYLVANIA 83 (1951). Soon after this study the Supreme Court held that 
such statutes were pre-empted by federal law to the extent that interstate commerce is 
affected [Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951)], 
and, as a result, they have fallen into disuse. 
102. See Williams, Settlement of Labor Disputes in Industries Affected with a 
National Interest, 49 A.B.A.J. 862, 868 (1963). 
103. N. S. Woods, The Practical Working of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbi-
tration System (unpublished paper). See also Tyndall, The New Zealand System of 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, 82 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REvmw 138, 144 
(1960). 
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pulsory arbitration under the RLA of "minor" disputes involving 
the airlines and railroads has not precluded settlement of the vast 
majority of those disputes before reaching the arbitration stage. 
Many employers and unions under the Taft-Hartley Act provide 
by agreement for arbitration of grievances; and, while it may be 
of little relevance to the settlement of "major" disputes involving 
formation of new contracts, most grievance and "minor disputes" 
are settled short of arbitration.104 
Of more relevance, Pan American World Ainvays and five unions 
have agreements requiring the terms of new contracts to be arbitrated 
if not settled privately. To date, all such disputes have been settled 
by collective bargaining.105 The experience of the railroads under 
Public Law 88-108106 also indicates that compulsory arbitration and 
collective bargaining can coexist. An arbitration board acting under 
this enactment established a series of guidelines to be used by the 
parties in connection with the size of train and yard crews. The 
parties were first to seek a settlement by negotiation; if that failed, 
the disputes were to be referred to local arbitration boards. The rail-
roads reported that 111 agreements were reached by bargaining under 
this procedure in a two-year period.107 In addition, an authoritative 
study of compulsory arbitration for public utilities in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania concluded that "bargaining relationships which 
were functioning success£ully before the enactment of the laws were 
not greatly disrupted by the statutes."108 
Another prevalent misconception is that compulsory arbitration 
is pro-management. However, management traditionally has not 
only refused to seek compulsory arbitration, but has actively op-
posed it.109 As one student of the labor movement noted, "arbitration 
rem~ins the recourse sought by the party which judges itself the 
104. For the experience under the RLA, see Goulard Statement 14. See also Vaca 
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 n.15 (1967). 
105. Goulard Statement 14. 
106. 77 Stat. 132 (1963). 
107. Statement by the Association of American Railroads Before ABA Special 
Committee on National Strikes in the Transportation Industries, May 3, 1967, at 17. 
108. R. FRANCE & R. LEsTER., supra note 132, at 87. 
109. The National Association of Manufacturers' Subcommittee on Emergency 
Disputes of the Industrial Relations Committee has recently taken a strong position 
against compulsory arbitration. BIG LABOR AND BIG STRIKES: ANALYSIS AND RECOM· 
MENDATI0NS 11-12 (undated pamphlet). In his article, Mr. Rosenman said: 
Opposition to compulsory arbitration has come with equal intensity from widely 
diverse ends of the political and economic spectrum. The subject has made as 
incredible a set of bedfellows as can be imagined: Wayne Morse and Barry 
Goldwater; the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers. 
113 CONG. REc. A3609 (daily ed. July 18, 1967). 
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weaker side in a labor dispute."110 The changing positions of labor 
and management in the transportation industry support this state-
ment. During the early days of union organization, the railroads 
were in the ascendancy and opposed compulsory arbitration. The 
unions, then on the weaker side, generally favored it. Many spokes-
men for labor testified in favor of compulsory arbitration at the 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in 
1883. The Knights of Labor, with a membership of 67,000 the most 
powerful labor organization during the 1880's, had a preamble of 
organization setting forth as one of its primary purposes "[t]he sub-
stitution of arbitration for strikes, whenever and wherever employers 
and employees are willing to meet on equitable grounds."m Today, 
after a turnabout in the relative bargaining strength of labor and 
management in the transportation industry, positions on compulsory 
arbitration have been reversed-railroads favor compulsory arbitra-
tion, as do several airlines, and the unions are opposed. One reason 
for this change of position is that transportation "is the indus-
try least equipped to withstand a strike."112 The imbalance in bar-
gaining power is caused by the nature of transportation: output can-
not be inventoried or stockpiled, demand cannot be deferred, li-
censed employees cannot be replaced, and partial operations cannot 
be conducted.113 Another distinction is that the lockout, one of man-
agement's primary weapons in other industries, is unavailable to 
transportation management because of public service considera-
tions.114 
Thus, the arguments of labor and management on the issue of 
compulsory arbitration reveal more about their relative power posi-
tions than about correct principle. With the disparity in bargaining 
power that exists in transportation, muscle has become the ultimate 
determinant-at the expense of collective bargaining.115 The unions 
110. Pitzele, Book Review, 8 LABoR HISTORY 101, 102 (1967). 
111. SENATE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT UPON nu: RELATIONS BE· 
TWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR 2 (1885). See also E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR 
ARBITRATION 6-10 (1952). . 
112. Statement by Samuel I. Rosenman in Hearings on S. 176 Before Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess., 16 (1967). 
113. Goulard Statement 7-8. 
114. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); Textile Workers 
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See also Michaelson v. United 
States, 291 F. 940, 944 (7th Cir. 1923) reu'd on other grounds, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). Cf. 
Brotherhood of Ry. &: S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 245 (1966). 
115. Collective bargaining is premised upon equality of bargaining power. See Cox, 
The Duty To Bargain in Goad Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403-09; G. TAYLOR, 
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF lNDUSTIUAL RELATIONS (1948). 
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argue against compulsory arbitration because they seek to retain the 
advantage which their muscle confers. From the standpoint of the 
public, however, an assertion that settlements engendered by sheer 
muscle are productive of economic wisdom is no less ludicrous than 
the medieval assumption that trial by battle was productive of moral 
wisdom. 
Despite all this, the political opposition which a compulsory 
arbitration proposal would engender from the unions may well be 
overwhelming.116 
F. Arsenal of Weapons 
The "arsenal of weapons," or choice-of-procedures, proposal 
stems from a desire to maintain the flexibility which ad hoc legisla-
tion provides while avoiding the undesirable side effects of such 
legislation.117 The premise is that all of the possible techniques for 
resolving a dispute are known or knowable in advance. Therefore, 
would it not be desirable for Congress to forearm a specialized agency 
to apply the most appropriate of these techniques in individual cases? 
The use of the techniques or procedures authorized by arsenal of 
weapons legislation would be discretionary. Some of the weapons 
would be distasteful. But a doctor preparing to go out on an emer-
gency call packs his bag full of instruments and medicines not be-
cause he expects to use all of them, but because he wants to be 
prepared to provide whatever treatment is needed without going 
back to his office. Hopefully, some of the procedures in the arsenal 
of weapons, like the castor oil in the doctor's bag, will not be needed. 
When they are needed, however, failure to use them could produce 
even more unpleasant consequences. Indeed, one of the arguments 
in favor of the arsenal of weapons approach is that the presence of 
distasteful alternatives will induce the parties to bargain rather than 
risk their application.118 
The RLA already provides part of an effective arsenal of weapons. 
One of the weapons is the emergency board, whose appointment by 
116. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 803, 810 (1967). 
117. Adlai Stevenson was among the earliest and most eloquent advocates of the 
choice of procedures approach: "Congress should give to the President, a choice of 
procedure when voluntary agreement proves impossible: seizure provisions geared to 
the circumstances; or arbitration; or a detailed hearing and a recommendation of 
settlement terms; or a return of the dispute to the parties." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1959, 
at 51, col. 2. See also Wirtz, The "Choice.-of,Procedures" Approach to National Emer-
gency Disputes, in EMERGENCY DISPUTES ,\1'1D Ni\TIONAL POLICY 149-65 (1955). 
IIB. See Raskin, Collision Cot1rse on the Labor Front, SAT. REV., Feb. 25, 1967, at 
32, 70. 
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the President is largely discretionary. Some contend that the prob-
able appointment of an emergency board in certain types of dis-
putes merely defers bargaining.119 Undoubtedly this is true when 
the emergency board's recommendations can be ignored with im-
punity by one party or the other. However, if the emergency board's 
powers were strengthened, the parties might be induced to bargain 
to avoid undesirable alternatives.120 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR RESTORING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
EMERGENCY BOARDS 
As shown above, recent experience has not confirmed the origi-
nal expectation of labor and management that acceptance of emer-
gency board recommendations would be virtually mandatory. The 
refusal of unions to accept these recommendations reflects labor's 
commanding bargaining power rather than its dissatisfaction with 
the composition of presidential boards. Emergency board members 
have generally been disinterested, distinguished, capable, and expert 
in the process of collective bargaining-characteristics relied upon 
in the proposal for permanent reform set forth below. Under this 
proposal, the responsibility for determining whether a dispute-or 
any part of it-should be submitted to arbitration would be trans-
ferred from Congress to the emergency boards. In deciding whether 
a dispute should be arbitrated, the emergency board would be 
guided by two important criteria: the effect of the threatened strike 
on the public and the prospect for settlement by collective bargain-
ing. If an emergency board were to determine that a dispute should 
be arbitrated, the parties would be given a reasonable period of time 
to agree upon acceptable arbitrators and procedures. If the parties 
should fail to do so, the emergency board itself would prescribe the 
terms of arbitration. Thus, it should be possible to restore emer-
gency boards to the effectiveness originally contemplated, and to 
eliminate what has been described as one-sided compulsory arbitra-
119. See Curtin, supra note 71, at 810. 
120. In addition, several miscellaneous proposals deserve some consideration. The 
restructuring of collective bargaining, continuous bargaining, and peace and harmony 
committees-while desirable-do not solve the underlying problem of protecting the 
public in those cases when such procedures simply do not work. "Nonstoppage 
strikes" would be unfair to one side or other unless the penalties are in exact equi-
librium-which is a practical impossibility. Making unions subject to the antitrust 
laws seems to offer little hope of reducing transportation strikes; because of the 
nature of transportation, a relatively small group of employees can shut down an 
entire system. Indeed, one might be tempted to conclude that undue proliferation of 
unions is one of the major problems in transportation. 
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tion in which the carriers, regulated by the government, are virtually 
compelled to accept emergency board recommendations which the 
unions can ignore with impunity.121 
One advantage of this proposal is that issues not susceptible to 
collective bargaining could be sorted out so that the proper func-
tioning of bargaining on other issues would not be impaired. An 
example of such an issue is the airline crew complement dispute. 
That dispute was not really a labor-management controversy at all, 
but a work assignment and jurisdictional conflict bet1veen t1V'o com-
peting unions. The pilot and flight engineer unions each argued 
that, from the standpoint of safety, it should have the third seat on 
jet aircraft.122 To expect collective bargaining to resolve this kind of 
dispute is to expect too much, since a concession to one union would 
bring only increased antagonism from the other. The crew comple-
ment dispute sired a "feather-bird"-an unneeded additional crew 
member on jet aircraft.123 Despite the settlement efforts of ten emer-
gency boards, 124 the controversy produced thirteen airline strikes 
totalling 510 days125 and upset collective bargaining relationships for 
a period of years. Had the emergency boards been given the authority 
proposed herein, their participation in the dispute would have been 
more meaningful and collective bargaining would not have been 
hampered by the stresses and strains engendered by conflict over a 
nonbargainable issue. 
Collective bargaining also fails to function well in settling issues 
involving technological change. The complexities of a proposed 
technological change may not be fully understood, or the change in 
the nature of jobs may threaten traditional bargaining relationships. 
As demonstrated by the railroad work rules dispute, a union threat-
121. In Hearings on S.J. Res. 81 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. II9-20 (1967), J. E. Wolfe, 
Chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference, testified: 
I remember not too long ago when Arthur Goldberg was Secretary of Labor 
we had an Emergency Board recommendation that the carriers felt could hardly 
be accepted without almost ruinous results. We called on the Secretary. I remem-
ber his words. "It would be intolerable for the railroads to refuse to accept these 
recommendations.'' And we knew it would be intolerable. We knew pretty well 
what the outcome would be. It would not only be intolerable, it would be ex-
tremely unpleasant. We accepted the recommendations. 
So we have what is tantamount to finality as far as we are concerned, but 
absolutely nothing where the unions are concerned. 
122. See Feinsinger Commission Report, May 24, 1961, at 22. 
123. Jacobs, Dead Horse and the Featherbird-The Specter of Useless Work, 
HARPER'S, Sept. 1962, at 47. 
124. See the Reports of Emergency Boards, No. 120, No. 121, No. 123, No. 124 
(1958), No. 135, No. 136, No. 142, No. 143 (1961), No. 144, No. 146 (1962) and the two 
Feinsinger Commission Reports of May 24, 1961 and Oct. 17, 1961. 
125. See Goulard Statement 26-27. 
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ened with extinction or a substantial loss of membership is unlikely 
to agree to a technological improvement, even though guaranteed 
liberal benefits for individual employees.126 Still, the public interest 
requires that technological improvement not be subject to a veto 
by a powerful union.121 
Other factors which have caused collective bargaining to falter 
too often, particularly when there is an imbalance of bargaining 
power, are the personalities, competence, or ambitions of the indi-
viduals at the bargaining table. As a prominent labor specialist 
observed, "There is usually one key individual on each side of the 
bargaining table, and the nature of the given negotiations depends 
largely on the character of these individuals and on what is moti-
vating them at the time."128 Incompetence poses special threats to 
the bargaining process. As one commentator stated: 
People need licenses to drive a taxicab, practice medicine, install 
plumbing or crop corns. Yet I have watched labor-management 
negotiators, who ought not to be allowed to cross the street without 
a seeing-eye dog, inflict hardship on millions of their fellow-citizens 
through sheer incompetence at the bargaining table-and there is 
not one thing anyone in the community can do to arrest them for 
reckless use of a dangerous economic weapon. No remotest relation-
ship exists between the capacity or social responsibility of the bar-
gainers and the degree of damage their status enables them to visit 
on the economy.129 
Whenever such impediments to collective bargaining threaten to 
inflict more injury on the public than on the parties, the emergency 
board-under this proposal-would be able to step into the bar-
gaining process. 
This proposal also allows an emergency board considerable flexi-
bility to determine what action short of arbitration should be used 
to bring about agreement benveen the parties. Thus, intransigence 
on either side during the bargaining process could be countered by 
the board's power to call in a referee in the name of the public. 
This discretionary power would certainly strengthen the board's 
ability to mediate a dispute.130 
The fact that the RLA applies to a limited part of the economy 
126. See Landis, The Dynamics of Emergency Disputes, in LABOR LAw DE-
VELOPMENTS 1967: PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE THIRTEENTH .ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 
209, 213 (1967). 
127. See 'Wisehart, Comment, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 92, at 37. 
128. D. Cole, THE QUEST FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE 9 (1963). 
129. Raskin, Collective Bargaining and the Public Interest, in CHAI.LENGFS TO COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 155 (1967). 
130. Seidman, supra note 92, at 491. 
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makes it possible to adopt this proposal without affecting the general 
practice of collective bargaining. All that is involved is a change in 
the locus of determination from Congress to the emergency board; 
the flexibility of being able to tailor the action taken to fit each dis-
pute would be preserved. Such a change would restore to emergency 
boards the status originally intended, give collective bargaining a 
last chance by strengthening mediation, and place in the hands of 
disinterested experts the delicate question of whether the nature of 
the dispute and the public interest are such as to require third-party 
determination. 
